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GUILTY PLEAS
bound and gagged defendant. Removal, tempered
by the use of modern technology suggested in
Justice Brennan's concurring opinion,"0 may be
the best method for preserving the essence of the
defendant's right to confrontation while allowing
the trial to proceed. A glass booth would be one
way of insulating the defendant yet allowing him
to take part in the trial process. However, the
difference between seeing a defendant shackled or
seeing him apparently caged within a booth is
conjectural.n A closed circuit television from which
the defendant may observe proceedings coupled
with a telephone to give him access to his counsel
may be sufficient to ameliorate the difficulties.'3
This method would be equally applicable in the
case of the political trial discussed in Justice
Douglas's concurring opinion." A political de-
0 Id. at 351 (1970).
31G. HAUSNxn, JusTICE IN JERusATYM (1966).
During the trial of Adolph Eichmann a glass booth was
installed to protect the defendant from possible as-
sassination.
'7Flaum and Thompson, supra note 1 at 337 n. 82.
"But see Id. at 337, where the authors maintain
that the expense involved in this method is too high,
especially in light of inadequate funds in smaller
counties to support minimally required facilities.
1Mr. Justice Douglas concurred with the basic
fendant who contests the constitutionality of the
law under which he is prosecuted or disputes the
propriety of the state's prosecutorial power in his
case35 would seem to have no more right to ex-
ceptions in judicial procedure than Allen. How-
ever, if the previously bound and gagged defendant
is found innocent, or if the law under which he is
charged is found unconstitutional, the court would
have helped create martyrs by restraining or in-
carcerating innocent men for protesting their
innocence too loudly. 6
In any event, because of the lofty stature in
which judicial dignity and decorum are held, it
appears that a disruptive defendant will not be
entitled to the benefit of unlimited constitutional
protection for "[t]he Constitution would protect
none of us if it prevented the courts from acting to
preserve the very process which the Constitution
itself prescribes." 7
hypothesis of the Court, but advised that guidelines
for dealing with a disruptive defendant may be dif-
ferent in a classical case such as AUen as distinguished
from a case involving political or subversive overtones.
See 397 U.S. at 351.
3 See 0. KTRC...1..-E, PoLiTicAL JusTicE (1961).
38397 U.S. at 353-355.
7aId.!gy350 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970);
Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970);
Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790 (1970)
The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that a
valid guilty plea must represent the voluntary
and intelligent act of a defendant. Herman v.
Claudy', for instance, stands for the proposition
that a conviction based on a coerced guilty plea
violates a defendant's right to due process. In
that case, Herman, after an allegedly coerced
confession, pleaded guilty without having been
advised of his right to counsel. Mr. justice Black,
writing for a unanimous Court, recognized that a
guilty plea may be coerced by an involuntary
confession or by an unintelligent waiver of the
right to counsel. In circumstances in which the
defendant's rights could not have been protected
in the absence of counsel, "it is entirely possible
1350 U.S. 116 (1956).
that petitioner's prior confession caused him, in
the absence of counsel,... "2 to plead guilty.
The Court continued to expand judicial scrutiny
of guilty pleas in United States v. Jackson ' which
held the death penalty provision of the Federal
Kidnapping Act unconstitutional. Under this
statute, if one pleaded guilty, the threat of the
death penalty was ipso facto removed.4 The Court
2Id. at 122.
' 390 U.S. 570 (1968).
' 18 U.S.C. §1201(a) (1964), The Federal Kidnapping
Act, stated:
Whoever knowingly transports in interstate com-
merce, any person who has been unlawfully seized,
confined, .... and held for ransom or reward or
otherwise... shall be punished (1) by death if
the kidnapped person has not been liberated
unharmed, and ifthe verdict of the jury shall so
recommend, or (2) by imprisonment for any term
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thus reasoned that by making the risk of the death
penalty the price of exercising the fifth amendment
right not to plead guilty and the sixth amendment
right to demand a jury trial, the statute needlessly
discouraged assertion of those rights. Mr. Justice
Stewart, writing for the majority, stated:
If the provision had no other purpose or effect than
to chill the assertion of constitutional rights... it
would be patently unconstitutional. 5
Since not every plea entered under the Act was
necessarily involuntary 6, the power of federal
judges to reject coerced guilty pleas could not
totally eliminate the unconstitutionality of the
capital punishment provision of the statute. Un-
fortunately, Mr. justice Stewart did not face the
problem of what to do with guilty pleas entered
before Jackson and allegedly coerced by the provi-
sion condemned in that caseY However, it is
arguable that on the basis of another fifth amend-
ment case, Griffin v. California,8 one would expect
that the petitioner who established that his plea
was coerced would be entitled to relief.
Finally, in two recent decisions, the Court es-
tablished a mandatory procedure for determining
of years or for life, if the death penalty is not im-
posed.
Hence, the defendant who pleaded guilty or who ob-
tained a bench trial escaped the risk of the death
penalty.
1390 U.S. at 581.
6 "T]he evil in the federal [kidnapping] statute is
not that it necessarily coerces guilty pleas and jury
waivers but simply that it needlessly encourages them."
Id. at 583 (emphasis in original).
The Court was not faced with this issue in Jackson.
That case was a review of the District Court's decision
to quash Jackson's indictment for kidnapping on the
ground that the Federal Kidnapping Act was unconsti-
tutional. See 262 F.Supp. 716 (1967). The Supreme
Court agreed that the death penalty provision of the
Act was unconstitutional, but held that it was severa-
ble from the rest of the Act. The purpose of Congress
to make kidnapping a federal crime is not frustrated by
removing the threat of the death penalty from the
statute. The case was remanded to the District Court
with instructions to reinstate the kidnapping count.
8 380 U.S. 609 (1965). Griffin held that the California
procedure of permitting the prosecutor or the judge to
comment on the defendant's silence violated the fifth
amendment right against self incrimination. Mr.justice Douglas, for the majority, concluded that the
procedure compelled the accused to testify against
himself, stating:
It [the commenting procedure] is a penalty im-
posed by courts for exercising a constitutional
privilege. It cuts down on the privilege by making
its assertion costly. Id. at 614.
Griffin can thus be viewed as holding that the de-
fendant who established that his waiver of a constitu-
tional right was in fact compelled by the government's
unconstitutional action is entitled to relief.
the validity of guilty pleas before they are ac-
cepted by the trial court. McCarthy v. United
States9 held that compliance with rule 11 of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure must precede
acceptance of the plea by federal judges. Such
compliance would insure that the plea is voluntary
and factually based.'0 Boykin v. AlabamaA ex-
tended the McCarthy mandate to the states.
The Supreme Court, however, has seemingly
reversed the trend of expanding judicial scrutiny
of guilty pleas during the past Term. McMann v.
Richardson"A, Brady v. United States"s, and Parker
v. North Carolina14 held that a defendant who
pleads guilty with the advice of reasonably compe-
tent counsel, notwithstanding the fact that the
plea may have been motivated by a coerced con-
fession or by the fear of a harsh sentence, not only
waives his fifth amendment right not to plead
guilty and his sixth amendment right to demand a
jury trial, but also in effect may relinquish his
right to habeas corpus review.
Mr. Justice White, writing for the majority in
each case, held that none of the respective peti-
tioners were entitled to habeas corpus relief. He
attached paramount significance to the presence of
counsel during the pleading process and to the
administrative efficiency of the criminal justice
system. Mr. Justices Brennan, Douglas, and
Marshall, dissenting in McMann and Parker
(while concurring in Brady) concluded that the
concept of voluntariness was not so narrowly de-
fined as to stand only for the opportunity, upon the
advice of counsel, to make a rational choice be-
tween going to trial and pleading guilty. Instead,
involuntariness "refers to a surrender of constitu-
tional rights influenced by considerations which
the government cannot properly introduce into
the pleading process." 15
9 394 U.S. 459 (1969).
10 FED. R. Cmm. P. 11 states:
A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty, or, with
the consent of the court, nolo contendere. The Court
may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, and shall not
accept such a plea or a plea of nolo contendere with-
out first addressing the defendant personally and
determining that the plea is made voluntarily
with understanding of the nature and the conse-
quences of the plea.... The Court shall not enter
a judgment upon a plea of guilty unless it is satis-
fied that there is a factual basis for the plea.
"395 U.S. 238 (1969).
397 U.S. 759 (1970).
13397 U.S. 742 (1970).
14 397 U.S. 790 (1970).




In McManm v. Richardson16 there were three
separate petitions for habeas corpus under con-
sideration, each of which the Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit found sufficient to compel a
hearing' Defendants Dash, Richardson, and
Williams, all charged with various criminal of-
fenses, pleaded guilty and were sentenced. After
unsuccessful application for relief in the state
courts, they sought habeas corpus relief alleging,
inter alia, that their pleas were coerced, that their
confessions were coerced, or that their attorneys
were incompetent.
Omr. Justice White recognized that a valid
guilty plea must be voluntary and intelligent, but
found nothing to indicate that the plea, as dis-
tinguished from the confession, was involuntary.
[A] petition for collateral relief asserting that a
coerced confession induced his plea is at most a claim
that the admissibility of his confession was mis-
takenly assessed [by counsel].n
The inquiry was reduced to whether the defendant
had made an intelligent choice, for White seemingly
equated the opportunity to make a rational choice
with voluntariness. However, in deciding whether
the defendant had in fact made an intelligent plea,
White refused to require that the advice of defense
counsel withstand retrospective examination in a
post conviction hearing. He explained the ma-
jority's position.
In our view, a defendant's plea of guilty based on
reasonably competent advice is an intelligent
plea not open to attack on the grounds that counsel
misjudged the admissibility of the confession.19
White placed such significance on the presence
of counsel during the pleading process that all
future pleas must be assumed to be voluntary,
except in the rare case in which the defendant is
actually coerced at the time of pleading. In the
majority's view, any misjudgment by counsel
would be understandable and not prejudicial in
light of the difficulties inherent in the decision to
plead guilty before all the evidence is in. Thus,
the defendant who alleges that he pleaded guilty be-
16 397 U.S. 759 (1970).
"7Dash v. Follette, 409 F.2d 1016 (2d Cir. 1969);
Richardson v. McMann, 408 F.2d 48 (2d Cir. 1969);
'Williams v. Follette, 408 F.2d 658 (2d Cir. 1969).
18 397 U.S. at 769.19Id. at 770.
cause of a prior coerced confession is not, with-
out more, entitled to a hearing.20
Nor does fear of the death penalty entitle peti-
tioner to relief. In Brady v. United States"l the
Court considered the contention that a guilty plea
was coerced if induced by the fear of a harsher
penalty. In 1959, Brady was indicted for kid-
napping in violation of the Federal Kidnapping
Act. Since the victim had not been liberated un-
harmed, Brady faced the risk of a death penalty if
he went to trial and was found guilty. Brady first
pleaded not guilty. He changed his plea to guilty
with the knowledge that his co-defendant had
earlier pleaded guilty and turned state's evidence.
In 1967, Brady applied for habeas corpus relief
alleging that his plea was invalid under United
States v. Jackson . The District Court, after a hear-
ing, found that the plea had not been induced by a
fear of the death penalty, but by the knowledge
that his co-defendant was available to testify
against him. The Court of Appeals accepted this
finding and affirmed the denial of relief.21
Mr. Justice White agreed with the findings of
the lower courts and reached the issue whether
the fear of the death penalty could render a guilty
plea invalid.24 Jackson, White noted, recognized
that not every plea rendered under the Federal
Kidnapping Act was involuntary. As there was no
evidence that Brady was so "gripped with fear"
of the death penalty that he could not make a
rational choice between going to trial and pleading
guilty, White concluded:
We decline to hold, however, that a guilty plea is
compelled and invalid under the Fifth Amend-
ment whenever motivated by the defendant's de-
sire to accept the certainty or probability of a lesser
penalty rather than face a wider range of possi-
bilities extending from aquittal to conviction and a
higher penalty authorized by law. 5
To hold otherwise would require forbidding guilty
20 Id. at 771.
"1397 U.S. 742 (1970).
2 See notes 3-6 and accompanying text.
"Brady v. United States, 404 F.2d 601 (10th Cir.
1968).24 Since Mr. justice White agreed with the finding of
the District Court for the District of New Mexico that
Brady's plea was not motivated by fear of the death
penalty, the case could have been decided without
reaching the issue of whether fear of the death penalty
could compel a guilty plea. That is, the issue of whether
a guilty plea is compelled by fear of the death penalty
was not properly before the Court in Brady.
25 397 U.S. at 751.
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pleas altogether, providing uniform penalties for
statutory crimes, or placing "the sentencing func-
tion in a separate authority having no knowledge
of the manner in which the conviction. . . was
obtained." 26 White's concerns were dear. The
administrative resources of the criminal justice
system would be severely overburdened by for-
bidding guilty pleas based on the expectation of a
lesser penalty than that for going to trial. Plea
bargaining would be seriously limited if not com-
pletely destroyed. In addition, the increase in the
habeas corpus petitions of prisoners attacking
their convictions based on such pleas would prob-
ably innundate the federal courts.n Furthermore,
the states would not only be faced with the burden
of trying more defendants to obtain convictions,
but would also have to allocate already strained
resources to retry those defendants who had
formerly pleaded guilty. The majority's desire to
avoid these burdens was evident. Indeed, Brady
could have been decided without reaching the
constitutional issue of whether fear of the death
penalty could compel a guilty plea 8
Finally, in Parker v. North Carolina,2' Mr.
Justice White's logic is fully developed. Neither a
coerced confession nor the fear of a harsher sen-
tence entities the petitioner to habeas corpus
relief. Parker, a black minor, was indicated for
first-degree burglary-an offense punishable by
death under North Carolina law unless the jury
recommends life imprisonment."0 His guilty plea,
after interrogation by the court, was accepted.
Parker received the mandatory sentence of life
imprisonment. After unsuccessful application for
relief in the state courts, certiorari was granted.
Parker alleged that his guilty plea was the invalid
product of a coerced confession and the fear of an
unconstitutional death penalty."
26 Id. at 753.
27 See Ross v. McMann, 409 F.2d 1029 (2d Cir. 1969)
(Lumbard, Moore, and Friendly, JJ., dissenting).
28 See note 24 supra.
397 U.S. 790 (1970).
0 N. C. GEN. STAT. §14-52(1969) provides:
Any person convicted, according to due course of
law, of the crime of burglary in the first-degree
shall suffer death: Provided, if the jury when
rendering its verdict in open court shall so recom-
mend, the punishment shall be imprisonment for
life....
At the time Parker's plea was accepted, N.C. GEN.
STAT. §15-162.1 (1953) provided that the maximum
sentence for a plea of guilty to first-degree burglary
was life imprisonment. This provision was repealed
in 1969.
31 Although the North Carolina courts refused to
consider whether the death penalty provision of N.C.
The Court, citing Brady, dismissed Parker's
claim that his plea was compelled by fear of the
death penalty. The death sentence discourse in
Brady, moreover, was only dicta (or should have
been).n It was nevertheless made law in Parker in
rather conclusory fashion. According to the ma-
jority, guilty pleas induced by the certainty of a
lesser penalty are not compelled. Parker's coerced
confession claim was dismissed on the basis of
McMann. In evaluating the validity of a guilty
plea allegedly based on a coerced confession, White
again limited the inquiry to whether the plea was
intelligent and based on the advice of reasonably
competent counsel. He argued that such advice
would enable the defendant to rationally weigh the
advantages between going to trial and pleading
guilty. Under McMann, any plea entered after
such a rational choice is assumed to be voluntary.
Under McMann and Parker, any such plea is prob-
ably intelligent as well. With McMann alone, Mr.
Justice White may not have expressly validated
all guilty pleas entered on the advice of counsel.
Under that case, a petitioner is entitled to a hear-
ing if he was incompetently advised by his at-
torney. 1 The standard for incompetence that will
award the petitioner a hearing is referred to by
White as "gross error" 14 or as "serious derelictions
on the part of counsel sufficient to show that his
plea [petitioner's] was not, after all, a knowing and
intelligent act." '5 However, this standard is seri-
ously weakened by Parker, for in that case Justice
White stated:
... even if Parker's counsel was wrong in his assess-
ment of Parker's confession, it does not follow that
his error was sufficient to render the plea unintelli-
gent.6 (emphasis added)
The standards of McMann are hence meaning-
less under Parker. Guilty pleas entered upon the
advice of counsel are not only assumed to be
voluntary, but also are most likely to be deemed
intelligent. The majority's position on counsel's
responsibility for determining the admissibility of
GEN. STAT. 14-52 (1949) was unconstitutional under
Jackson v. United States, the Court nevertheless as-
sumed that the North Carolina statute might have
been unconstitutional in reaching the result in Parker.
That is, even if the provision had been unconstitutional.
Parker's plea was still not compelled. See State v.
Peele, 274 N.C. 106, 161 S.E.2d 568 (1968).
2 See note 24 supra.
"397 U.S. at 772.
34 Id. at 772.35 Id. at 774.
"6 Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790, 797(1970).
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confessions must be viewed as another step toward
insulating guilty pleas from collateral attack. The
adminitrative efficiency of the criminal justice
system will be increased, for it is difficult to imagine
a petitioner prevailing upon an allegation of in-
competence of counsel in his advisory capacity.
The majority's elimination of coerced confes-
sions and the fear of a harsher penalty in deter-
mining the validity of guilty pleas was attacked by
Mr. Justices Brennan, Douglas, and Marshall.
Although each concurred in the denial of relief to
Brady, their concurrence was based on the District
Court's finding that the plea was not motivated by
fear of the death penalty. The threat of the death
penalty had been identified, according to Brennan,
as a factor to be considered in determining whether
a particular defendant knowingly waived his con-
stitutional rights." Brennan challenged White's
logic and showed that the converse of the latter's
interpretation of United States v. Jackson's is
equally true--not every defendant who pleaded
guilty under the Federal Kidnapping Act did so
voluntarily. Brennan concluded:
If a particular defendant can demonstrate that the
death penalty scheme exercised a significant influ-
ence upon his decision to plead guilty, then, under
Jackson, he is entitled to reversal of the conviction
based on his illicitly produced plea.
The dissenters also attacked the attachment of
"talismanic significance" to the advice of counsel
in these cases. That is, in none of the cases could
the advice of counsel offset the constitutional
defects introduced into the pleading process. In
McMann, each petitioner faced an "unconstitu-
37Id. at 810. Mr. Justice Brennan cites Green v.
United States, 355 U.S. 184 (1957) and Fay v. Noia,
372 U.S. 391 (1963) in support of his contention. In
Green, it was contended that defendant, convicted of
second-degree murder on an indictment charging first-
degree murder, waived his objections to a second trial
for first-degree murder by successfully appealing his
conviction of second-degree murder. The Court re-jected this contention, holding that the law does not
place defendants in such an incredible dilemma. In Fay,
it was contended that the petitioner was barred from
habeas corpus relief for deliberately by-passing the
state appellate process. The Court, "[n]oting that the
petitioner had been faced with the grisly choice of
foregoing his appellate rights or facing a possible death
sentence if his appeal were successful," held that "the
failure to seek state appellate review, motivated by
fear of the death penalty, could not be interposed to
bar the federal habeas corpus remedy." Parker v. North
Carolina, 397 U.S. 790,810 (1970) (Brennan, Douglas,
and Marshall, JJ.)
I See notes 3-6 and accompanying text.381397 U.S. at 808.
tional" New York procedure for determining the
validity of confessions. 0 In Brady and Parker,
"there was no action which counsel could take to
remove the threat posed by the unconstitutional
death penalty scheme." 4 The dissenters would,
therefore, continue to follow Herman v. Claudy4
and determine
whether, under all the circumstances of the case the
pressures brought to bear on the defendant were
sufficient to render [a] plea involuntary."3
McMann, Brady, and Parker represent a de-
parture from the traditional concept of volun-
tariness employed by the Court. As defined by Mr.
Justice Brennan:
"involuntary" has traditionally been applied to
situations in which an individual, while perfectly
capable of rational choice, has been confronted with
factors which the government may not constitu-
tionally inject into the decision making-process.4
(emphasis added)
This concept of voluntariness has been replaced by
Mr. Justice White's requirement of an opportunity
to make a rational choice between trial and a
guilty plea. Under McMann, Brady, and Parker,
this new standard is apparently met by evidence of
the advice of counsel, notwithstanding the fact
that counsel may not be able to effectively coun-
teract the unconstitutional factors introduced into
the pleading process. It seems Mr. Justice Brennan
was correct when he concluded:
... the Court moves yet another step toward the
goal of insulating all guilty pleas from subsequent
attack no matter what unconstitutional action of
government may have induced a particular plea.45
That the effect of the three cases will be to limit
federal habeas corpus proceedings can hardly be
doubted. McMann, Brady, and Parker illustrate
the desire of the majority to finalize trial court
40The New York procedure for determining the
voluntariness of confessions, approved in Stein v. New
York, 346 U.S. 156 (1953), consisted of submitting the
confession to the jury with all the other evidence with
instructions to disregard the confession if it was found
to be inadmissible. The procedure was declared un-
constitutionalin Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964).
4 McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 781 (1970)
(dissenting opinion).
"350 U.S. 116 (1956).
43397 U.S. at 778.
4 Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790, 802 (1970)(dissenting opinion).45McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 775 (dis-
senting opinion).
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